We investigate the Church-Kalmár-Kreisel-Turing Theses concerning theoretical (necessary) limitations of future computers and of deductive sciences, in view of recent results of classical general relativity theory. We argue that (i) there are several distinguished Church-Turing-type Theses (not only one) and (ii) validity of some of these theses depend on the background physical theory we choose to use. In particular, if we choose classical general relativity theory as our background theory, then the above mentioned limitations (predicted by these Theses) become no more necessary, hence certain forms of the ChurchTuring Thesis cease to be valid (in general relativity). (For other choices of the background theory the answer might be different.)
Introduction
Certain variants of the so-called Church-Turing Thesis play a basic role in the foundations of theoretical computer science, logic, meta-mathematics and the so-called "fundamentals of deductive sciences". The Thesis is a well-reasoned, well-motivated "conjecture" 3 . The Thesis was formulated before "black hole physics" was developed. We will recall the Thesis and some of its variants in detail in Section 2.
Roughly speaking, the variant we are interested in concerns inherent limitations of possible future computing devices. These limitations deal with idealized computers, therefore they do not involve particular data like the size of our Universe, etc. i.e. these limitations are supposed to be necessarily (i.e. theoretically) true in some sense. On the other hand they do involve some physical theory about time, space, motion and things like that as we will argue in Section 2. Clearly, if we do not presuppose a consistent theory about time, space, motion etc. then it is impossible to formulate Theses of the kind we are referring to. Very roughly, these variants of the ChurchTuring Thesis conjecture that if a mathematical function f will be realizable at least in principle by an arbitrary future "artificial computing system" then f must be Turing-computable 4 . Here again, the future "artificial computing system" is understood as being idealized and f is realized by the system if in theory it is realized by the theoretical description (design) of the system.
In passing we note that this Thesis has many important consequences. One consequence says that "paper-and-pencil-computability" coincides (and will always coincide) with machinecomputability. Here by paper-and-pencil-computability we understand realizability by an algorithm in the mathematical sense (where we note that the mathematical notion of the algorithm goes back to ancient Greeks, in some sense).
Remark. Some authors, e.g. Pitowsky [25] argue that the Thesis we are interested in is not really Church's Thesis but Wolfram's Thesis (cf. [Wolfram 1985 ] from the references in [25] ). The argument states that Church was not interested in computers, but instead he was interested in the "purely mathematical" notion of an algorithm. We would like to pose the following counter-arguments to this objection collected in items (1)- (5) below.
(1) It is exactly this subtlety because of which we refer to those variants of the Thesis we want to discuss here as Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses 5 (instead of calling it Church's or ChurchTuring Theses). Perhaps Church himself was not interested in computers but Kalmár and Turing were, and they did take part (emphatically) in refining, publishing etc. of the "abstract, idealized, theoretical, future-computer-oriented" version of the Thesis 6 . (2) Independently of Church's original motivation, if we look into the literature of our natural sciences today, we find that in the branches listed in the beginning of this introduction (e.g. theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, etc.) the "abstract computer-oriented" version of the Thesis is being used essentially under the name "Church's Thesis", cf. Odifreddi [19] , I.8. (pp. 101-122), Gandy [8] , Kreisel [14] . Consequently we think that it is completely justified to investigate the question of under what assumptions these "incarnations" of the Thesis are valid and it is reasonable then to refer to these incarnations as (variants of) Church's Thesis.
(3) We quote from the textbook of Odifreddi [19] , p. 51: "Turing machines are theoretical devices, but have been designed with an eye on physical limitations". Hence, if we are talking about the Church-Turing Thesis (as is quite customary) then we cannot agree with Pitowsky's and others claim that the Thesis would be only about the purely mathematical notion of algorithms and would have nothing to do with the limitations of idealized physical computers. (Actually, Gandy [8] investigated in some detail the "idealized physical computer" aspect of the Church's Thesis.) (4) The issue whether the Church-Turing Thesis is only about the pure mathematical notion of an algorithm or whether it also concerns the theoretical limitations of idealized, abstract computing devices (based on some physical theory), has been discussed extensively in the literature of theoretical computer science, logic and related fields. E.g. a special issue of the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic [18] is devoted to the subject. We cannot quote all the relevant references here but many of them can be found in [19] , I.8, scattered over pp. .
The general conclusion is that the Church-Turing Thesis is not one Thesis but a collection of several Theses 7 some of which deal with the purely mathematical concept of algorithms while other (just as respectable) ones concern (among others) the theoretical limitations of idealized future computing systems which subject will be further elaborated in a more unambiguous manner in Section 2 below.
(5) In [19] , p. 103 one can read that in meta-mathematics Church's Thesis is used to prove "absolute unsolvability". To our minds this clearly points in the direction we want to go; namely if a problem is decidable by performing a thought-experiment (consistent, say, with the classical general relativity) then the problem is not absolutely unsolvable (nevertheless it may remain unsolvable for various reasons like lack of resources). We finished our remarks concerning Pitowsky's objection.
The notion of "computable function" splits up into at least three notions. These are (i) computability by a pure mathematical algorithm (in the purely mathematical sense); (ii) computability by some idealized, future computing device based on some physical theory (like classical general relativity or quantum mechanics, etc.); (iii) computability by some computing device based on our present physical world-view i.e. taking into account all of our present day physical, cosmological, etc. knowledge on the Universe we are living in.
We would like to illustrate that distinctions between (i)-(iii) are reasonable and not trivial by the following.
In connection with the distinction between (i) and (ii) we note that if we want to define paperand-pencil-computability done by a group of mathematicians, the question comes up whether we allow one of the mathematicians to take an air trip during the course of their computations (or take a trip by a space-ship to a rotating black hole); if we say yes we need to select a physical theory to control these motions.
Our intended, main distinction between (ii) and (iii) above is that in (ii) physical theories are considered as sets of consistent physical laws without initial data in contrast with (iii) where particular initial data are also taken into account (and the most general known physical theory is used). Furthermore we emphasize that "selection of a particular physical theory" in (ii) is acceptable from science-historical viewpoint only, i.e. without taking into account the particular development of physical sciences we have no reason to choose a certain physical theory, we always should use the whole present physical world-view. Note also that by lack of "monotonity" of the development of physical theories, by selecting a certain theory, we have to face the fact that our statements within the framework of the chosen theory may not continue to hold in a more general (future) theory 8 . We will call the ways of computability listed in (i)-(iii) as computability of the first kind, etc., respectively. In the present work we want to show (among other things) that computability of the first kind and second kind are not necessarily equivalent 9 .
7 cf. e.g. [19] p. 123. 8 E.g. in classical electrodynamics one deduces that electrons must emit electromagnetic radiation while orbiting around nuclei; this statement is not true in a more general theory, called quantum mechanics. 9 In principle this non-equivalence could be attacked by the approach of the school of Pour-El et al [27] but here we are "more ambitious" in the sense that we want to keep our computers "programmable and logic oriented" Further, we note that computability of the third kind does not fit smoothly with present day computability theory in the sense that most Turing-computable functions are not computable of the third kind (e.g. by lack of enough time for a huge calculation if the Universe has finitely long future only). Hence in the present work we do not want to discuss computability of the third kind, while we acknowledge that it is a potentially interesting subject. We note that in our opinion the most emphatically used obstacle in [25] applies only to computability of the third kind, hence it does not apply to the main subject of this paper which is computability of the second kind. (We also note that the famous classical theorists of the field e.g. Kalmár, Kreisler, Turing, were more interested in computability of the second kind than in the third kind, in our opinion).
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will recall and discuss the above mentioned variants or incarnations of the Church-Turing Thesis (called Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses). Then, in Section 3, we will raise the question whether within the framework of classical general relativity theory some forms of the Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses admit a counterexample. We will find that, very probably, such a counterexample is possible, at least in theory. Both in [4] and in [25] there are some obstacles to the possibility of such kinds of counterexamples. We will look at these obstacles one by one in Section 4 and will argue that they can be avoided in the case of a certain thought-experiment (i.e. a certain "design of the idealized future computing device"). E.g. we will argue that the observer who will find out the solution of an "unsolvable problem"
10 does not have to pay with his destruction for accessing this piece of knowledge. The basic ideas elaborated in this paper have been around for a while. For example in the academic year 1987/88 at the University of Iowa in Ames (USA) one of the present authors gave a course in which these ideas were discussed 11 , see also [1] [2]; in 1990 Pitowsky in [25] considered such ideas in a slightly more pessimistic spirit, and in 1995 Earman in [4] examined such ideas under the name of constructibility or possibility of Plato machines ( [4] pp. 101-123). However, the emphasis in Earman's book and other works like [5] , [6] and [7] is more on "supertasks" rather than on the Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses. Other related work we mention is Grünbaum's [9] . This list of references is far from being complete, e.g. we should have mentioned the important paper of Hogarth [12] which will be essential in our considerations. Hamkins and Lewis [10] is a recent paper in this direction. In view of the above, the purposes of the present paper are the following: (i) put the emphasis on the Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses (instead of e.g. supertasks) in a thorough, systematic way; (ii) formulate exactly which versions of the ChurchKalmár-Turing Theses we want to investigate (and what do they mean); (iii) formulate carefully what we understand under a counterexample for these variants; (iv) see if the apparent obstacles e.g. listed in earlier works can be avoided (at least in theory).
The Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses
In this section we formulate some variants of the Church-Turing Thesis based on the hierarchy of definable functions f : N → N. We follow notation and definitions of [19] . Thesis 1 below (i.e. "digital" as opposed to "analog") explained more clearly in Section 3. We will show the non-equivalence by describing idealized future computing devices (e.g. in Proposition 1) which realize functions not Turing computable. We think computability of the first kind cannot be too different from Turing computability (and our second kind computable functions in Section 3 are rather far from being Turing computable). 10 For instance the consistency of ZFC set theory can be such a problem. is only the first approximation of the Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses we want to investigate; therefore beyond Thesis 1 we will use more unambiguous, more carefully specified, more tangible formulations-variants of the Theses. These will be Thesis 2-2' and 3 (Theses 4-4' are for completeness only).
Let X be a finite set and denote by X * the set of finite sequences over X. For sake of convenience we choose X := {0, 1}. Definition 1. We call a function f : X * → X * Turing-computable if there is a Turing machine which realizes f . 3
For the definition of a Turing machine, see Definition I.4.1 while the realization of a function by a Turing machine is formulated in Definition I.4.2 of [19] .
As it is well-known, the set of natural numbers, N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, can be represented as X * i.e. there is a bijection N ∼ = X * which is effectively computable in the intuitive sense. Consequently the notion of a Turing-computable number-theoretic function f : N → N is well-defined i.e. Turing-computability of these functions is independent of the representation of N as an X * 12 . Introducing the notation
where N + = {1, 2, . . .} denotes the set of positive integers, we can see that N k can also be regarded as a subset of Y * where Y contains some extra element in comparison with X, for example Y := {0, 1, −} = X ∪ {−}. As an example, 101 − 11 ∈ Y * corresponds to the pair (5, 3) ∈ N 2 in this notation. In this way we can talk about the Turing-computability of a function f :
In this way we have defined decidable and recursively enumerable m-ary relations for all m ∈ N + . Next we introduce a natural hierarchy from the computability viewpoint on the set of relations. (ii) We say that the relation R ⊆ N m is a Π 1 -relation i.e. R ∈ Π 1 if R ∈ Σ 1 . Here R := N m \R is the complement of R with respect to N m ; (iii) In general, we say that a relation R ⊆ N m is a Σ n -relation i.e. R ∈ Σ n (n ∈ N, n ≥ 2) if there is a k ∈ N and a Π n−1 -relation S ⊂ N m+k such that
(iv) In general, we say that a relation R ⊆ N m is a Π n -relation i.e. R ∈ Π n if R ∈ Σ n . 3
We will use Σ n also as the set of all Σ n -relations, and similarly for Π n . Thus e.g. R ∈ Σ 2 \(Σ 1 ∪Π 1 ) means that R ∈ Σ 2 but R / ∈ Σ 1 and R / ∈ Π 1 , i.e. R ∈ Σ 2 and neither R nor its complement is recursively enumerable.
Notice that every function f : N k → N m may be considered as a relation
R f is called the graph of f . We will say that a function f :
By keeping in mind the definition of Turing machines, one can easily show the following (see e.g. [19] ):
(i) A function f is Turing-computable if and only if its graph R f is recursively enumerable, i.e. if R f ∈ Σ 1 .
(ii) A relation R is decidable if and only if both R and its complement are recursively enumerable, i.e. if and only if R ∈ Σ 1 ∩ Π 1 .
Thus, R ∈ Σ 1 \Π 1 means that R is recursively enumerable but R is not decidable. As an example, one may consider the relation D e defined by a Diophantine equation e(x, y, a) as follows
which is clearly Σ 1 but not necessarily Π 1 i.e. it is not necessarily decidable although recursively enumerable. Indeed, there are choices of the equation e(x, y, a) for which D e is undecidable. One can see that there are relations in Σ 2 which are not recursively enumerable because of using existential quantifications in their definitions. In general, there are Σ n -relations which are not Σ n−1 -relations, and, intuitively, the Σ n -relations are "harder to compute" than the Σ n−1 -relations. The sets Σ n , Π n measure the degree of non-computability of a relation by means of Turing machines i.e. algorithms. For details see Chapter IV of [19] . The hierarchy Σ 1 , Π 1 , . . . , Σ n , Π n , . . . (n ∈ N + ) is called arithmetical hierarchy. It provides us subsets R ⊂ N m which are further and further away from being computable. Beyond the arithmetical hierarchy comes the so-called analytical hierarchy. We note that the first order logic theory T h( N, +, * ) of arithmetics is at the bottom of the analytical hierarchy.
At this point one may raise the question if there is a hypothetical extended Turing machine such that all the elements of Σ 1 would become decidable by this machine. Such an extended Turing machine should possess only one extra property compared to the ordinary Turing machines. Indeed, it should be able to answer the following question in finite time: does a given ordinary Turing machine stop with a given input y or not? Such an extended Turing machine certainly exists as an abstract mathematical object but it may or may not be realized physically.
It is possible to show that, by using this one extra ability, all elements of Σ 1 become decidable (in the extended sense) while elements of Σ 2 would become recursively enumerable (in the extended sense). This means that, by using these extended Turing machines, every relation would become "less non-computable with one unit".
The concept of a Turing machine is an extraction, idealization or an abstract formulation of our experience with physical computers. By a physical computer (in the narrow sense) we mean a discrete physical system together with a physical theory for its behaviour (see [19] , p. 104). Hence one may ask if the above mentioned extended Turing machine can be realized as a physical computer. We will say that a function f : N k → N m is effectively computable if there is a physical computer realizing it. Here by "realization by a physical computer"we mean the following.
Let P be a physical computer, and f :
Then we say that P realizes f if an imaginary observer O can do the following with P . Assume O receives an arbitrary element (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ N k from, say, his "opponent". Then O can "start" the computer P with (x 1 , . . . , x k ) as an input and then sometime later (according to O's internal clock) O "receives" data (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ N m from P as an output such that (y 1 , . . . , y m ) coincides with the value f (x 1 , . . . , x k ) of the function f at input (x 1 , . . . , x k ). The reason why we wrote "start" and "receives" in quotation marks is that we do not want to specify how O can start P etc., these can be specified by the designer of the computer P . The essential idea is that O can use P as a device for computing f . The difficulty which we have to circumnavigate (when defining what we mean by saying "P realizes f ") is that f is an infinite object. The solution is that we postulate that for any permitted choice of the input data (x 1 , . . . , x k ), computer P will produce an output (y 1 , . . . , y m ) and in addition, this output will coincide with f (x 1 , . . . , x k ). We emphasize that this definition does not require repeated activations of P , instead it says that whatever inputvalue (x 1 , . . . , x k ) we would choose, P will produce an output coinciding with f (x 1 , . . . , x k ).
In this context we may quote the original form of the Church-Turing Thesis ( [19] p. 102):
every effectively computable function is Turing-computable.
In light of Thesis 1 above, our extended Turing machines cannot be regarded as physical computers in the narrow sense, since they are able to realize elements of Σ 2 .
By using ideas of László Kalmár, let us try to formulate a more tangible (and somewhat stronger) version of the above Thesis. Of the many roles Turing machines play in scientific thinking, let us concentrate on the following one. Turing machines provide idealized, abstract "approximation" of artificial computing systems 13 . The next version of the Thesis will say that arbitrary future artificial computing systems will realize only such functions f : N k → N m which are Turing-computable (i.e. recursive). To make the meaning of the next version of the Thesis clear, we ask ourselves what artificial computing systems are. The answer is the following.
Any such system presupposes that we fix a physical theory (which is consistent with our present day knowledge) and on the basis of this theory we design an artificial system which is capable to associate natural numbers to natural numbers in some well-defined way. (Here welldefined means that, in terms of the chosen physical theory, it is clearly explained how to give an "input" to this system and how to interpret whether it gave an "output" and what this output is.)
But what is an artificial system? Does it have to fit into a box, for example? If yes, what are the limits of the size of the box? (What happens if the system uses a futuristic version of, say, Internet? What if this net grows during the course of computation in question?) If we do not want to be "short-sighted" we should not suppose that the system fits into a box (or anything like that).
In view of the above considerations, for the purposes of the present paper, we propose to identify an artificial computing system G with what we call here a thought-experiment 14 . The definition of when we say that a mathematical function f is realized by a fixed artificial computing system G (or thought experiment) follows the same pattern as we defined earlier the concept of when a physical computer (in the narrow sense) realizes function f . Therefore we do not repeat that definition. We would like to clarify a bit the sense in which we use the expression "thought-experiment" in Definition 4 above. If G is a thought-experiment (i.e. artificial computing system), then there is a fixed physical theory T h associated to G such that using theory T h one can specify precisely how the thought experiment G should be carried out. If using T h together with the specification of G someone can prove that G realizes f , then we conclude that indeed G realizes f . We note that this does not mean that using T h and the specification of G we could compute with pencil and paper what the answer of G will be to a certain input, say 3. We only know that G(3) = f (3) holds 15 . Trivially, the class of artificial computing systems, defined in this way, includes the class of physical computers (in the narrow sense) used to formulate Thesis 1 (cf. [19] p. 104). Moreover, the question naturally arises whether extended Turing machines introduced above exist in the class of artificial computing systems or not? Notice also that a function f which is realizable by an artificial computing system is computable of the second kind according to the terminology developed in Section 1. Now we are ready to formulate a sharper version of Thesis 1.
Thesis 2 (Church-Kalmár-Turing). Every function f : N k → N m realizable by an artificial computing system gives rise to a relation R f ∈ Σ 1 i.e. every function realizable by an artificial computing system is Turing-computable.
Or, trivially re-formulated, we can state:
every function realizable by a thought-experiment is Turing-computable.
Clearly, all versions of the Thesis (i.e. 1-2') presuppose some physical theory as a background. We will argue that the truth of Theses 2-2' can actually depend on the choice of our background 14 Assume a physical theory is fixed. Then by a thought-experiment relative to the fixed physical theory we mean a theoretically possible experiment, i.e. an experiment which can be carefully designed, specified, etc. according to the rules of the physical theory but for the actual realization of it we might not have the necessary sources, technical level, enough time, etc.
To illustrate the idea: if the physical theory in question is classical mechanics then we conjecture that there are no thought-experiments which would realize a function f which is not Turing-computable. 15 On the other hand, if in a "universe" U , the theory T h was true and someone had the resources for carrying the thought-experiment through, then at the end he would find out the value of f for any given prespecified input. physical theory.
A kind of corollary of the Thesis taken together with Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem is the following.
Thesis 3. Assume ZFC set theory is consistent. Then, necessarily, Humankind, or its Successors, can never prove or become certain that this is so.
The above form is a kind of common meta-mathematical interpretation of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. We will argue that the refutability (or provability) of Thesis 3 can also depend on the choice of our background physical theory.
For completeness, below we will formulate a further version of the Thesis which goes off in a different angle called sometimes "limitations of human knowledge". This will be Thesis 4-4'. We may formulate Thesis 4 as follows. If we suppose that the "input-output aspect" of each single human problem solving activity is nothing but a finite answer to a finite question formulated in a language fixed in advance, then one may declare:
Thesis 4 (Church-Descartes-Turing). Every mental activity of human beings realizes Turingcomputable functions.
This idea can be traced back to Descartes. If we accept psychological materialism in the form that every mental product of a human being is completely determined by his brain the above Thesis can be re-formulated as
Thesis 4' (Church-Descartes-Turing). The human brain realizes Turing-computable functions.
We included Theses 4-4' only for completeness, in our investigations we will concentrate on Theses 2-3. Our reason for formulating so many versions of the Thesis is that for each one of Theses 2-3 we will argue that they admit counterexamples if we work in classical general relativity theory 16 . So, if the reader is interested in any one of Theses 2-3 then he can read the rest of this paper with that version of the Thesis in mind. For definiteness, we will always formulate our statements to attack Thesis 3.
In the following section we try to construct an artificial computing system based on the ordinary theory of Turing machines and classical general relativity which is supposed to be able to realize non-Turing-computable i.e. non-recursive functions. These machines are also counterexamples for versions 2-3 of the Church-Kalmár-Turing Theses formulated above. The basic idea is essentially the same as that of Malament, Hogarth [12] and Pitowsky [25] ; it is summarized by Earman (see Chapter 4 of [4] ). Moreover we will see that, our thought-experiment, which is a modified version of the one constructed in [4] , is free of the problems listed by Earman and Pitowsky.
It would be interesting to see which level of the arithmetical hierarchy can be made "computable" by using classical general relativity theory; and what is the "price" of going further up in the hierarchy. That is, what extra assumptions do we need to make (if any) if we want to make a higher level of the hierarchy to become "computable". The complexity classes in the analytical hierarchy are denoted by Σ k n and Π k n (k, n ∈ N). For any of these functions the question whether it can be made "computable" admits a precise, unambiguous formulation because all these functions (in Σ k n etc.) are definable in the language of set theory (and even in the higher-order logic language of arithmetics N, 0, 1, +, * ). So, one can write up the arithmetical definition of the function f and one can ask if there is a thought-experiment realizing precisely this function.
We note, however, that non-computable functions necessarily remain even if one uses relativistic (or other) powerful phenomena to compute more and more complicated functions. The reason for this is a simple cardinality argument: any thought-experiment can be expressed as a finite sequence of (English) sentences, therefore there are countably many thought-experiments only. It follows, that only countably many functions can be realized by a thought-experiment. On the other hand, the cardinality of N → N type functions is the continuum. Therefore, there must exist a function, which cannot be realized by a thought-experiment.
Computers in the Kerr space-time
In this section we will follow the notation and terminology of [4] (see also [11] , [28] ). By a spacetime we mean a pair (M, g) where M is a smooth, oriented and time-oriented four-manifold while g is a smooth Lorentzian metric on M which is a solution to the Einstein's equations with respect to a physically reasonable matter field represented by a smooth stress-energy tensor T on M (i.e. T satisfies one of the standard energy conditions). For the notions concerning general relativity we refer to [11] , [28] . The length of an at least once continuously differentiable time-like curve γ : R → M is the integral
As usual, we interpret a future-directed, time-like, at least once continuously differentiable curve γ : R → M as a "world-line" of an observer moving in (M, g), i.e. imγ ⊂ M is the collection of those events in M which the observer meets throughout its existence. Moreover γ , the length of the world-line, is thought of as the proper time measured by the observer γ from its beginning of existence to its end. This can be finite or infinite depending on the curve and the geometrical structure of the space-time characterized by the metric g. Now we introduce an important class of space-times related with our subject. Consider a point (event) q ∈ M. The set of all points J − (q) := {x ∈ M | there is a future-directed non-space-like continuous curve joining x with q} is called the causal past of the event q (the causal future is defined similarly). Intuitively, J − (q) consists of those events x ∈ M from which one can "travel" to q without exceeding locally the speed of light i.e. by an "allowed" motion. [25] . A very concrete, physically reasonable realization of this device in the case of the Kerr space-time will be explained soon.
Imagine the following situation, as an example. γ P is asked to check all theorems of our usual set theory (ZFC) in order to check consistency of mathematics. This task can be carried out by γ P since its world line has infinite proper time. If γ P finds a contradiction, it can send a message (for example a light beam) to γ O . Hence if γ O receives a signal from γ P before the Malament-Hogarth event p he can be sure that ZFC set theory is not consistent. On the other hand, if γ O does not receive a signal before p then, after p, γ O can conclude that ZFC set theory is consistent. Note that γ O having finite proper time between the events γ O (a) = q (starting with the experiment) and γ O (b) = p (touching the Malament-Hogarth event), he can be sure about the consistency of ZFC set theory in finite (possibly very short) time. This contradicts Thesis 3 above.
At this point we may ask if Malament-Hogarth space-times are reasonable physically or not. Most examples are very artificial but it is quite surprising that among these space-times one can recognize the anti-de Sitter space-time, which is a solution to the vacuum Einstein's equations with negative cosmological constant and is in the focus of recent investigations in theoretical physics; the Reissner-Nordström space-time describing a spherically symmetric black hole of small electric charge and the Kerr-Newman space-time representing a slowly rotating black hole of small electric charge. For a description of these space-times see [11] as a standard reference. In what follows we are going to focus our attention to the Kerr space-time because in light of the celebrated black hole uniqueness theorem (see [11] , or for an overview [28] while a short new proof was presented by Mazur [15] ) this space-time is the only candidate for the late-time evolution of a collapsed rotating star. Hence existence of Kerr black holes in the Universe is physically very reasonable even in our neighbourhood. For instance, a candidate for such a black hole is the supermassive compact object in the center of the Milky Way; this question can be decided in the next few decades [16] . In this context it is remarkable that this space-time possesses the Malament-Hogarth property. Now we would like to construct the artificial computing system G = (γ P , γ O ) as a correct thought-experiment in the case of the vacuum Kerr space-time (M, g). This means that we have to describe the time-like curves γ O and γ P around a slowly rotating black hole of zero electric charge. To do this, we will follow [20] . Using Boyer-Lindquist coordinates (t, r, ϑ, ϕ), the Kerr metric g with parameters m > 0 (mass) and a (angular momentum per unit mass) locally takes the shape (see [11] [20] [28] )
where Σ(r, ϑ) = r 2 +a 2 cos 2 ϑ and ∆(r) = r 2 −2mr+a 2 . We choose the underlying manifold M to be a smooth four-manifold which can carry the maximal analytical extension of the metric 17 . This metric possesses two Killing fields, namely ∂/∂t and ∂/∂ϕ corresponding to time-translations and rotations around the "axis" of the black hole, respectively. The singularity is given by the equation Σ(r, ϑ) = 0 and has ring-shape while the event horizons are characterized by the real roots r ± to the equation ∆(r) = 0:
Note that this equation has real roots only if |a| ≤ m, i.e. in the case of "slowly rotating" black holes. We restrict ourself to the non-extremal case |a| < m. Assume a future-directed time-like geodesic γ : R + → M is given, describing the free motion of a point-like particle of unit mass. In the above coordinate system this curve locally is given by the four functions γ(τ ) = (t(τ ), r(τ ), ϑ(τ ), ϕ(τ )) satisfying the well-known second order geodesic equations. We can identify such a curve uniquely by fixing the initial position and velocity (γ(0),γ(0)) where dot means differentiation with respect to the affine parameter τ ∈ R + . However, if γ(0) is not on the axis of the black hole, then by Lemma 4.2.5 of [20] we can use the data (γ(0), sgnṙ(0), sgnθ(0), q, E, L, Q) to fix the geodesic γ as well 18 . The quantities (q, E, L, Q) are the "first integrals" of the geodesic motion, i.e. these quantities are constant along the geodesic curve. Here q := g(γ,γ) is equal to −1 since γ is time-like and the point particle is of unit mass. E := −g(γ, ∂/∂t) is the total energy of the particle measured by a distant observer, L := g(γ, ∂/∂ϕ) is the angular momentum of the particle with respect to the "axis" of the black hole given by points satisfying ϑ = 0, π. The constant Q is called the Carter-constant and is characterized by the system of ordinary differential equations (see Section 4.2 of [20] )
A remarkable observation of Carter shows that Q is constant along a Kerr-geodesic (see Theorem 4.2.2 of [20] ) and characterizes Kerr-geodesics in a simple way whether they hit or not the ring singularity. First, we consider the freely falling observer γ O : [0, τ − ] → M. Choose a particular point q ∈ M somewhere "outside" the black hole, not lying on the axis and let γ O (0) := q. Let sgnṙ O (0) = −1, while sgnθ O (0) = ±1 arbitrary and take 0 < E O , |L O | < 2mE O r + /a. These data provide for a (particle-like) observer moving along γ O to enter the Kerr black hole, i.e. to cross the outer event horizon. Moreover, if we take Q O = 0 then by Corollary 4. 
The case of the physical computer is very simple. We may assume the initial data are γ P (0) = γ O (0) = q (the observer γ O and the computer γ P start from the same point) and take γ P : R + → M to be a geodesic corresponding to a stable circular orbit in the equatorial plane of the Kerr black hole. This implies sgnṙ P (0) = 0, sgnθ P (0) = 0, Q P = 0 and E P > 0, E 2 P < 1. We can calculate the radius of the circular orbit of γ P by Lemma 4.14.9 while the corresponding angular momentum L P can be determined via Corollary 4.14.8 of [20] (the concrete values are not interesting for us in this moment). Trivially, γ P = ∞.
This arrangement shows that, since both γ P and γ O move along geodesics, their acceleration is constantly zero, i.e. remains bounded throughout their existence. A three-dimensional picture of the machine is shown on Figure 1 . We can see that in the case of Kerr space-time the Malament-Hogarth event appears for γ O when he touches the inner horizon of the Kerr black hole (in a finite proper time, of course). As it is well known [11] [28] the inner horizon of the Kerr black hole is a Cauchy horizon for outer observers showing that this space-time fails to be globally hyperbolic. Later we will see that this is a general property of Malament-Hogarth space-times. Although after crossing the inner horizon the predictability of the fate of γ O breaks down, it seems he can avoid the encounter with the final destroying singularity in the stomach of the Kerr black hole as a consequence of the ring-like shape of the singularity. Now that the Kerr-orbits of the falling traveler γ O and the orbiting computer γ P are determined, let us turn our attention to the communication between them by fixing a simple coding system. For sake of definiteness, assume we want to attack Thesis 3. Consequently we have to derive all the theorems φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . of ZFC set theory and check if there exists a theorem, say φ i , which coincides with the formula FALSE or equivalently with x = x. Then γ O and γ P choose a Turing machine T which enumerates all the theorems of ZFC. In this way T realizes a function f T : N → {Formulas of ZFC} such that imf T is exactly the set of theorems in ZFC (it is easy to find such a T ). Now, γ O and γ P agree on using the same choice of T . Then γ O departs for the Kerr black hole (taking a copy of T with him) while γ P keeps on executing the following simple algorithm.
A Suppose that ZFC is inconsistent. Then γ P will find the first i ∈ N for which f T (i) =FALSE. Suppose the proper time needed for γ P to find this i was τ i P (the experiment started at τ O = τ P = 0). Let us mention that for anyone who has a copy of T and knows the speed of γ P 's implementation of T , the number i is computable from τ i P .
Since γ P knows when it is sending the signal and it knows γ O 's plans, γ P can compute how much time γ O will have for receiving the coded signal and can also compute the expectable blueshift of the signal (see Section 4). So γ P can make compensations for these effects (to the extent theoretically possible). Now, γ P sends off a signal. γ O receives it before the Malament-Hogarth event p and measures the time τ 19 . To keep the number of possible fake signals at minimum, we may assume that γ P will not send a simple light beam only but uses some modulation or coding (some Morse-type sequence of "long" and "short" impulses, for instance) to make its signal much more unique. We emphasize that this modulation, or coding is also fixed once and for all in advance between γ O and γ P .
If γ O does receive a signal before the Malament-Hogarth event, then he checks if the relevant theorems in ZFC are consistent or not. If no, then γ O concludes that what he received was a fake signal.
If he did not receive any other signal by p, then he concludes that ZFC is consistent. If he received the prearranged coded signal at some different time, say τ ′ O , too, then he goes through the above checking procedure for deciding whether this second signal is fake or not. We assume that γ O and γ P agree on a sufficiently complicated and long code to minimize the chance for fake signals. Further, by the nature of the possible origin (or cause) of a fake signal and by taking into account that on γ O 's clock only finite time goes by between γ O 's departure and his arrival at the Malament-Hogarth event p, we can expect that γ O will receive only finitely many fake signals (before reaching p, of course). Consequently γ O has to check only a finite number of signals and after that he will know whether or not ZFC is consistent.
Let us briefly return to the possible imprecision of γ O 's measuring τ . Then he will calculate that it was sent between τ i P and τ i P + ε P . But only finitely many theorems were checked by γ P within this interval, consequently γ O can corrigate this uncertainty with finite calculations only (i.e. by checking the falsity of finitely many theorems from ZFC only).
Hence, by assuming the ability of time measurement of arbitrary accuracy (which is always possible in classical physics, but see remarks in Section 4), the arrangement G provides a thoughtexperiment, consistent with classical general relativity, contradicting Thesis 3. Having designed an artificial computing system which checks consistency of ZFC, we now turn to seeing what other jobs can be done with similar artificial computing systems. Let us return in general to Theses 2-3 formulated in Section 2. As we said in that section, first we have to assume a physical theory. Let this theory be the classical general relativity. Next, let us suppose that the observer γ O wants to decide a Σ 1 -set of N which is not Π 1 i.e. recursively enumerable but non-decidable. The above considerations can be used by γ O for designing a thought-experiment that is, an artificial computing system G = (γ P , γ O ) which will help him to decide such a set. Definition 6. Let R ⊆ N m be a relation. We say that an artificial computing system (or thought-experiment) G decides R if and only if G realizes the characteristic function χ R : N m → {0, 1}. 3
From now on, we will call G = (γ O , γ P ) a relativistic computer, indicating that this is a special artificial computing system i.e. thought-experiment. Now we are in a position to state: Proposition 1. (i) Let R ∈ Σ 1 be a relation with possibly R ∈ Π 1 i.e. recursively enumerable but possibly non-decidable. Then there is a relativistic computer G = (γ P , γ O ) which decides R.
(ii) There exist infinitely many relations R ∈ Σ 1 \Π 1 . Hence there are infinitely many Turingundecidable relations which are decidable by some G = (γ P , γ O ) as in (i) above.
Proof.
(ii) This is well known (c.f. [19] ). An example is if we take R to be the set of valid theorems of first-order logic.
(i) Let R ∈ Σ 1 . Then R is recursively enumerable i.e. there is a Turing machine T which enumerates R. (In other words, T realizes a surjective function f T : N → R with imf T = R.)
Now, we design the relativistic computer G which, we claim, can decide R. To test this claim, the "opponent" chooses a random element (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ N k and gives it to G for deciding whether or not (x 1 , . . . x k ) ∈ R. In the initial state of their computation, γ O and γ P are sitting together, making plans about how to decide this question. γ P receives the task of using T to enumerate the elements of R and checking whether (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ N k shows up during this enumeration. That is, γ P executes the program Make other planned actions to ensure that γ O receives the signal. STOP
The rest of the preparations γ P and γ O make are exactly the same as was the case of the relativistic computer G described above Proposition 1 for refuting Thesis 3. (So here again they rely on precise measurment of time to rule out fake signals, and again γ O takes the Turing machine T with him such that he can compute f T (i) for any fixed i).
After the Malament-Hogarth event p, γ O will be able to decide whether the input (x 1 , . . . , x k ) received from the "opponent" is in R because if he received a signal (before p) and he (successfully) checked the signal for correctness in the above outlined way, then he knows (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ R. Otherwise he knows (x 1 , . . . , x k ) / ∈ R. We finished the proof. 3
Corollary 1. There are infinitely many functions
Proof. Let R ∈ Σ 1 \ Π 1 . It is known that there are infinitely many such sets, cf. e.g. [19] . Let f := χ R be the characteristic function of R. Then f : N → {0, 1} is non-Turing computable because R is undecidable by R / ∈ Π 1 . Let G := (γ P , γ O ) be the relativistic computer deciding R. This exists by Proposition 1. Let G ′ be the same but instead of "yes" or "no" let it give as an output 1 or 0. Then
Below we will prove stronger theorems. By Proposition 1, relativistic computers can decide any undecidable but recursively enumerable relations R ∈ Σ 1 \ Π 1 . It is natural to ask whether harder sets of natural numbers become decidable if we switch to relativistic computers. The next proposition says that the answer is in the affirmative.
Proposition 2. Let n > 0. There are infinitely many relations
such that some relativistic computer decides R.
Proof. Let H ∈ Σ 1 \ Π 1 be arbitrary. Define
(i) R / ∈ Σ 1 because we cannot enumerate its second part H × {0} and R / ∈ Π 1 because we cannot enumerate the complement of its first part H × {1}. (Hint: R ∈ Σ 1 ⇒ we can enumerate R ⇒ we can enumerate those elements of R which end with 0 ⇒ we can enumerate H × {0} ⇒ we can enumerate H.) It can be seen that R ∈ Σ 2 (by H ∈ Π 1 ).
(ii) By Proposition 1 there is a relativistic computer G deciding H.
The new G ′ deciding R does the following: If it receives an input (x, k) and if k > 1, then
′ prints out the same answer as G. If k = 0 then G ′ prints out the negation of the answer of G.
Clearly
Since R / ∈ Σ 1 ∪ Π 1 , our new computer G ′ constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 decides sets harder than recursively enumerable sets and complements of recursively enumerable ones. This means that we can "climb higher" with one extra degree of unsolvability with Proposition 2. We have the following corollary, immediate from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. There are infinitely many
Σ 2 \ (Σ 1 ∪ Π 1 ) functions f : N → N realizable
by relativistic computers. (Of course these functions are non-Turing computable). 3
We note that the simplest examples of R ∈ Σ 2 \ Σ 1 relations are the characteristic functions χ H of relations H ∈ Σ 1 \ Π 1 . We claim that relations decided relativistically by Proposition 2 cannot be obtained in this way. Therefore by Proposition 2 we can decide Σ 2 -relations which are strictly more complex (i.e. harder) than the simplest examples for R ∈ Σ 2 \ Σ 1 .
Let us ask if we can decide even harder sets than in Proposition 2. Each relation decided by Proposition 2 can be regarded as a disjoint union of a Σ 1 -set and a Π 1 -set. In the next proposition we will decide relations in Σ 2 \ (Σ 1 ∪ Π 1 ) which cannot be obtained as such disjoint unions. In some sense this means that we can decide even broader spectrum of hard relations. (ii) R is decidable by a relativistic computer G = (γ O , γ P ).
Proof. Let H ∈ Σ 1 \ Π 1 be arbitrary, n > 0. Define
is similar to the one that was before but now γ P can send two different kinds of signals to γ O , say S a and S b . The input for G is of the form (a, b, k) = ((a, b), k) (where k refers to the (2n + 1)-th component of R f ). The case distinction between k > 1 and k ≤ 1 is similar to that in the proof of Proposition 2. If k > 1 then γ O automatically prints "no".
Assume k = 1. γ P does the following: It starts searching for a in H. If it finds a ∈ H then sends out S a to γ O and starts a search for b ∈ H. If it finds b, then sends S b . Now γ O does the following: If he receives no signal, then prints out "no". If he receives S a and no S b then prints "yes". If he receives S b and no S a then prints "no". Finally, if he receives both an S a and S b , then he prints "no".
Assume k = 0. Then γ P starts two parallel processes P a and P b . If P a finds a ∈ H it sends off a S a while if P b finds b ∈ H it sends S b . If γ O receives no signal, he prints "yes". If he receives S a but no S b then prints "no". If he receives an S b then prints "yes" (independently of other possibly received signals).
(ii) In connection with R f not being a disjoint union of a Σ 1 and a Π 1 set, we note only the following. Let
Then R 1 = R × {1} with R = T H . So, in some sense, the "complexity" of R 1 is determined by the "complexity" of R. But R was of the form R = {(a, b) | a ∈ H and b / ∈ H} with H ∈ Σ 1 \ Π 1 . So clearly R / ∈ Σ 1 because of the "b part" and R / ∈ Π 1 because of the "a part". To save space, we omit the rest of the proof, since the present proposition is not of a central importance. 3 By Proposition 3 above, relativistic computers can solve problems much harder than the nonTuring computable problem of deciding an undecidable but recursively enumerable (i.e. Σ 1 \ Π 1 ) relation.
The next proposition shows that the extended Turing machine, we discussed between Definition 3 and Definition 4 in Section 2-which for any Turing machine T and possible input (x 1 , . . . , x k ) decides whether T terminates-is also realizable by a relativistic computer G. Proof. G is of the form (γ P , γ O ) as usual. γ P and γ O , sitting together, receive as input a program pr(T ) for some T and a possible input (x 1 , . . . , x k ) for T . For simplicity we will write "T " for pr(T ).
Then γ O takes a copy of T and (x 1 , . . . , x k ) with himself and starts his journey "toward the Malament-Hogarth event" p ∈ M. Then γ P starts executing T with input (x 1 , . . . , x k ). If T terminates, γ P sends a signal to γ O . At (or after) the Malament-Hogarth event, γ O does the following. If no signal arrived then prints "diverges". If he received a signal from γ P then γ O knows that T converges with (x 1 , . . . , x k ). Consequently γ O can safely start executing T with (x 1 , . . . , x k ) and he knows that T will terminate in finite time. When T terminates, then γ O prints out whatever output T yielded. 3
In light of Propositions 1-4 and Corollaries 1-2 above we can decide general Σ 1 -sets and are able to realize hard Σ 2 -sets by our relativistic computer G contradicting Theses 2-2'. In our opinion, the above considerations point in the direction that if we choose classical general relativity as the background physical theory then Theses 2-3 turn out to be false because they deal with computability of the second kind. The reason why Thesis 1 cannot be attacked is the difference between an artificial computing system (i.e. a thought-experiment in a consistent physical theory) and a physical computer in the narrow sense: it is possible that our artificial computing system cannot be realized as a physical computer, although we remark that the almost-sure existence of large rotating black holes in galactic nuclei and properties of these black holes (see below) point towards the effective realizability of our thought-experiment, i.e. towards the possible violation of Thesis 1, too.
Remark.
A reader who is not a specialist of general relativity theory, may ask the following question. Why do we need (something as "fancy" as e.g.) rotating black holes, why is a "simple" Schwarzschild black hole (of sufficiently big mass) not enough for our thought-experiment 20 ? (Instead of rotating ones, electrically charged black holes would do the job just as well, but this is not the issue here, since the question is why do we need something more complex than the most "classical" Schwarzschild holes.) The answer is the following.
For the sake of argument, let us use Schwarzschild coordinates for describing the spacetime outside the non-rotating black hole. Let γ O and γ P behave as in the thought-experiment described above (involving Kerr black holes). Now, it is true that from the point of view of γ P , the clocks of γ O slow down so much that when γ O receives a yes (or no) answer from its computer, then according to γ P 's coordinate system, γ O is still outside of the event horizon. The problem is that to send the answer to γ O such that he receives it still before hitting the singularity (which event is impossible to avoid in this case), γ P would need to use so called tachyons (FTL-signals) . Indeed, if γ P finishes the computation in a large enough but finite time, then the light γ P sends after γ O will converge to γ O in a similar rate as γ O converges to the singularity but will not reach γ O before γ O crosses it 21 . The problem is alleviated e.g. by using rotating black holes, very roughly as follows. In a rotating black hole behind the event horizon we just discussed, there is a second inner event horizon which is a Cauchy horizon as well. If γ O approaches the black hole along the orbit considered above, then not later than γ O reaches the second horizon, he will meet the signal sent by γ P . As we indicated, making our black hole rotate is only one of the possible solutions but this choice is strongly supported by the "naturality" of rotating black holes i.e. their very possible real existence. The meaning of Proposition 5 is the following. A very important property of globally hyperbolic space-times is that they possess a so-called initial data surface (called Cauchy surface) i.e. fixing data of physical fields along the Cauchy surface only (which is a three-dimensional submanifold of M), one can determine the values of these fields over the whole space-time via the corresponding field equations. The above theorem shows that a Malament-Hogarth space-time does not possess such an initial data surface i.e. always contains events q ∈ M which are unpredictable even fixing initial data on arbitrary large subsets of M, for example on a space-like submanifold S ⊂ M. Especially, the Malament-Hogarth event p ∈ M is such an event. We met this phenomenon 20 Cf. e.g. footnote 5 on p.83 of [25] . 21 This can be seen by looking at the Penrose diagram of the extended Schwarzschild space-time.
in the special case of the Kerr space-time already. The difficulties caused by this fact will be discussed soon.
Another very important property of Malament-Hogarth space-times is the "infinite blueshift effect". Roughly speaking, as a consequence of the infinite time contraction seen by the observer γ O approaching the Malament-Hogarth event p ∈ M, all signals of finite energy or frequency will hit γ O at p ∈ M by an infinite amount of energy, i.e. Malament-Hogarth space-times act as unbounded gravitational amplifiers near p ∈ M. More precisely, the following theorem holds (Lemma 4.2. of [4] 
This theorem is a trivial consequence of the assumption that the original observer γ P sent an infinite amount of energy to γ O , since it sends signals of constant frequency ω P throughout its infinite existence. Now we wish to discuss the consequences of these properties of Malament-Hogarth spacetimes in the special case of the Kerr black hole against building relativistic computers constructed in Section 3.
(1) First we are going to study the effects of the infinite blueshift, the problem formulated in Proposition 6 above. We consider first whether γ O can survive the encounter with the inner event horizon or not. A similar but more detailed consideration like Proposition 6 shows that near its inner horizon, the Kerr black hole amplifies every, arbitrarily small deviation from the original vacuum space-time structure in an unbounded amount, yielding that this horizon rather looks like a real curvature singularity (i.e. not a pure "coordinate singularity"). This phenomenon is known as the "infinite mass-inflation" in the physics literature and appears if one calculates the effect of the infinitely amplified absorbed energy on the metric near the inner horizon. At first look, in the case of perturbations of the metric by a scalar field, this singularity turns out to be a scalar curvature divergence on the inner horizon [26] . This fact is usually interpreted as the instability of the (vacuum) Kerr space-time. Hence, after realizing the mass-inflation phenomenon, physicists supposed the non-traversability of the Kerr black hole.
A more careful analysis of the situation was carried out by Ori [21] [22] in the case of the Reissner-Nordström black hole and partially in the case of the Kerr-Newman black hole, however. In accordance with his calculations (accepting the validity of certain technical assumptions) it seems that despite the existence of the scalar curvature divergence, the tidal forces remain finite moreover negligible in the case of realistic Kerr black holes when crossing the inner horizon. Hence although the inner horizon (which contains the Malament-Hogarth event) is a real curvature singularity it is only a so-called weak singularity because the tidal forces still remain finite on it. As an example [22] , for a Kerr black hole of mass M = 10 7 m ⊙ ( m ⊙ refers to solar mass) and age T = 10 6 years (more precisely this is the age of the initial perturbation of the Kerr black hole) the relative distortion of an object of typical size l crossing the inner horizon is ∆l l ≤ 10 −55 .
In summary, although the Malament-Hogarth event is situated in a "dangerous" region of the Kerr-Newman space-time, in theory at least, it can be approached by the observer γ O . Next we may ask about the strong (electromagnetic) radiation absorbed by γ O during the course of crossing the inner event horizon, as another consequence of the blueshift effect. This problem was studied by Burko and Ori [3] . They conclude that these effects remain also finite making it theoretically possible to survive such an encounter for γ O although one may worry about the intensive pair creation induced by the extremely high energy photons [3] . Of course these considerations require more detailed analysis in the future, see also [24] .
Summing up, we can conclude that accepting a very rough, classical picture for the inner horizon of the Reissner-Nordström and Kerr-Newman black holes, their traversability is reasonable. In our artificial computing system G = (γ P , γ O ), the physical computer γ P sends a modulated light beam to γ O . Proposition 6 above suggests that even the (energetically) mildest answer of γ P will simply destroy γ O by receiving an infinite amount of energy. This is valid only if γ P sends electromagnetic signals of constant frequency through an infinite proper time (measured by γ P ), hence Proposition 6 is not surprising. If γ P sends a finite signal answering a simple "yes" or "no", the received energy by γ O remains finite in light of results of Burko and Ori. Hence, the pessimistic consequences of Proposition 6 are ruled out for the relativistic computer designed in the present paper.
(2) The stability of the circular orbit around the Kerr black hole required for γ P was also studied by Kennefick and Ori [13] and Ori [23] . They studied the effect of the gravitational radiation of the Kerr black hole on the evolution of a point particle moving on an initially circular orbit around the Kerr black hole. The answer is also encouraging, the perturbation seems to be negligible yielding the stability of stationary circular orbits, hence the computer γ P can orbit around the black hole for long time (hence with little effort for ever).
(3) We mention at this point again, that both curves γ P and γ O are geodesics in the Kerr space-time i.e. the acceleration along them is zero i.e. bounded. Hence in this situation one does not have to worry about the negative consequences of a possibly infinite acceleration, see [25] .
(4) Next we turn our attention to the consequences of Proposition 5. The essence of this theorem is that the Malament-Hogarth event p ∈ M cannot be predicted even fixing initial data on the whole spatial surface S ⊂ M which is a Cauchy surface for the outer observer γ P . This fact is interpreted by Earman in [4] , p. 118 by saying that the observer γ O , while crossing p ∈ M, is able to decide whether a signal came from γ P or from a possibly past singularity if and only if he is able to perform an infinitely precise discrimination in spatial directions which is physically unreasonable (but although theoretically it is allowed in classical physics). As suggested also by Earman this problem is apparently solved by using a coding system between γ P and γ O because in this case the information of the result of the calculation γ P just completed is not carried simply by the direction of the light beam. But this solution is also rejected by Earman by another "infinitely precise discrimination" argument ( [4] p. 118) essentially based on the assumption that γ P wishes to send a possibly unbounded amount of information to γ O . But as we clarified in the beginning of this section for our purposes we need to answer yes or no questions only, using a previously fixed code. Hence the length of the message sent by γ P is bounded uniformly hence Earman's infinite discrimination argument is not valid in this moment.
But apparently, as we have seen, γ O must be able to perform infinitely precise measurement of time because in our model the detection time carries a lot of information. Notice however that this assumption is not an extra one; it is already assumed by accepting that γ O , before crossing the Malament-Hogarth event p ∈ M, is always able to detect signals from γ P . Namely, the length of the signal received by γ O tends to zero, hence very close to p ∈ M γ O must be able to detect arbitrary short signals; consequently if he can do it certainly can measure its detection time arbitrary accurately, too; we soon discuss how to deal with this problem (of "infinite precision").
Summing up, we went through all the major possible classical obstacles published so far against building the artificial computing system G = (γ P , γ O ) performing computability of the second kind, listed in [4] , [25] and references therein. We found that these obstructions can be removed at the classical level (hence in classical general relativity) i.e. they do not kill the idea of designing a thought-experiment suitable for deciding Σ 1 -sets of natural numbers (because the quoted objections do not destroy the idea of the relativistic computer we designed in the present paper).
As a final remark we have to emphasize again that we have omitted all the quantum effects in our model. In general, the accuracy of time measurement, which is required for γ O , is not a problem in classical physics while in quantum physics it is constrained by quantum fluctuations. In this moment we do not possess a satisfying theory to describe the consequences of these quantum fluctuations in the presence of strong gravitational fields. Of course this is because a satisfactory theory of quantum gravity has not been formulated yet. We can do only naive considerations taking into account the basic principles of quantum mechanics and general relativity. Using results of Ng [17] we can say the following about the accuracy of time measurment. Assume we have a clock with total running time ∆T over which it can remain accurate and is capable for a time measurment of accuracy ∆t. Then one can derive an inequality ∆t ≥ (∆T t where t P = G/c 5 ≈ 10 −43 sec is the Planck-time. In our case we require a time measurment with an unboundedly increasing accuracy from γ O 's clock till the Malament-Hogarth event. Consequently, without the violation of the above inequality, in principle the observer γ O can constantly "tune" his clock to be more and more accurate (∆t → 0) for shorter and shorter times as he approaches the Malament-Hogarth event (∆T → 0). Possibly this clock cannot be used after the Malament-Hogarth event but this is not a problem. But notice that interpreting the Planck-time t P as the fundamental smallest time unit then accuracy beyond t P is meaningless. This might destroy the realizability of our thought-experiment in a quantum framework. This means that if we use quantum gravity in place of classical general relativity as our background theory, then we should design our artificial computing system differently. However, since the theory of quantum gravity does not exist yet, it seems pointless to try to elaborate the details nowadays.
Moreover a generally accepted quantum gravitational phenomenon is the black hole evaporation. Finally this may cause that every (Kerr) black hole will evaporate in finite time making it impossible for γ P to send signals to γ O in very late times. Hence these and other, yet unknown, quantum phenomena occurring in strong gravitational fields can eventually also annihilate our considerations.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the physical reality of performing an infinitude of calculations in finite time in order to answer very interesting questions.
One of the present authors (I.N.) had discussed the various Theses formulated in Section 2 with one of their originators László Kalmár, and he feels that Kalmár would be pleased by the kind of approach taken in the present paper.
